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Abstract:  
 
The article provides an analysis of the Laval Judgment in light of Habermas’ theory of discursive 
practice and compares the European social model and the Swedish system of collective agreements in 
light of this theory. In this context, the article argues, the comprehensive dismissal by the European 
Court of the carefully constructed and balanced Swedish system of social dialogue between 
management and labour is truly the most disturbing aspect of this controversial judgment. For all the 
supposed importance placed on discursive practices and social dialogue for the European social model, 
when confronted with the Swedish system of social dialogue, the Court retreats in the familiar 
territory of hard law and statutory obligations. In doing so, it wilfully misunderstands the function of 
collective bargaining, by effectively decoupling its process from its function, and leaving social 
dialogue with the hollow role of a deliberative practice devoid of any finality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since the ECJ delivered its Laval judgment on 18 December 2007, the name of this 
small Latvian company has become notorious. The sole mention of ‘Viking and Laval’ has 
become short-hand for those critical of a certain idea of Europe giving primacy to economic 
considerations to the detriment of ‘social Europe’. This article intends to go back to the 
original Laval judgment to reconstruct its history and deconstruct its myth. 
 
The Viking and Laval judgments have been criticised for using freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services respectively as ‘trumps’ against the fundamental right of 
freedom of association and collective action1. What protection for the right to strike after 
what the Court decided, one was inclined to ask? Were we going to see social dumping 
become the norm, a race to the bottom that would see Eastern European workers compete 
against their Western counterparts by offering their low labour cost as their best asset? 
These are crucial questions and they have justly been discussed extensively elsewhere. This 
article will only consider the Laval judgment, and will explore a different angle, by taking 
as its starting point Habermas’ theory of discursive practices as guarantees for a democratic 
outcome and offering the Swedish system of collective agreements as a substantiation of 
such practices. In this context, the article will argue, the comprehensive dismissal by the 
Court of the carefully constructed and balanced system of social dialogue between 
management and labour is truly the most disturbing aspect of this controversial judgment. 
For all the supposed importance placed on discursive practices and social dialogue for the 
European social model, when confronted with a successful example of such model, the Court 
retreated in the familiar territory of hard law and statutory obligations. In doing so, it 
wilfully misunderstood the function of collective bargaining, by effectively decoupling its 
process from its function, and leaving social dialogue with the hollow role of a deliberative 
practice devoid of any finality, the very openness of which both signifies and nullifies its 
democratic credentials.    
  
The article is structured as follows: Part I provides the theoretical grounding for the 
argument, by considering how discursive practices have influenced our conception of 
democracy, including in the area of industrial relations. Part II focuses on the development 
of social dialogue in European law, from its introduction in the Single European Act in 1986 
to arts 154-155 TFEU. Part III considers how the Swedish social model puts in practice the 
theory of social dialogue in its system of collective agreements, heavily dependent on 
deliberative practices between management and labour, and with a minimal statutory 
framework. Part IV summarises the facts of the case brought by the Latvian company Laval 
un Partneri against the Swedish building and public works trade union. Part V analyses the 
decision of the Court, concentrating on the value judgment made by the Court of the system 
of collective agreements described above and its continued viability following Directive 
96/71 (the Posted Workers Directive). Finally, Part VI considers the aftermath of this 
decision at the national level, with the passing of the ‘Laval Law’ by the Swedish 
government in 2010, and at the European level, with the issuing by the Commission of a 
draft new Directive on the Enforcement of Directive on Posted Workers in March 2012, 
before offering some concluding remarks.   
                                                 
1 More comprehensively, Laval belongs to a ‘quartet’ of cases decided in rapid succession by the ECJ along 
similar lines, comprised of C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767; C-438/05 The International 
Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union [2207] ECR I-10779; C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] 
ECR I-1989; and C-319/06 Commission vs Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323, hereafter referred to as Laval, 
Viking, Rüffert and Luxembourg.  
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2. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE 
 
According to John Dunlop’s system of industrial relations2, a tripartite structure, including 
workers, employers and the State, is engaged in a framework of collective bargaining where 
the speaking positions reflect opposing, and to a certain extent, irreconcilable viewpoints, 
and the goal is to reach a compromise where all partners engage in the discussion using the 
‘weapons’ at their disposal; in the case of the workers or employees, this is the tool of the 
withdrawal of labour, or the threat of industrial action.  
 
In contrast, deliberation as a form of discursive practice in Habermasian terms, or ‘civil 
dialogue’, can be conceptualised as a more open framework, where a consensus can be 
reached by actors engaged in the dialogue in a non-confrontational form, ‘through 
exchanges of arguments accepted as valid by the participants in the public debate’3. 
 
Social dialogue, defined as the ‘institutionalised consultation procedure involving the 
European social partners, [or also] the processes between social partners at various levels 
of industrial relations4, seems to sit uneasily between these two extremes, sharing elements 
of both, and, seemingly, failing to provide any of the benefits of its two more established 
predecessors. Its openness to deliberative processes is coupled with an integrative thrust to 
the given of the Single Market project to the exclusion of alternative paths, in a misguided 
effort to accommodate the ‘social’ to the reality of the market, never the other way around. 
This logic of commitment, through social dialogue, to a predetermined outcome risks 
undermining any advantages conferred by the deliberative ethos to the bargaining process5.    
 
The following table summarises the differences between the frameworks. Attention is called 
particularly to the difference in mode, means, goals and outcome; in these, social dialogue 
distinguishes itself by its soft nature, with reference to the lack of bindingness of the 
outcome as well as the way in which deliberation is structured; its targeted deliberation, in the 
sense that the dialogue is not ‘free-flowing’ but channelled through approved paths and 
rigidly constructed ‘givens’; and its predetermined consensus, because the rupture of the 
framework is not an option, as exemplified by the outcome category, where the potential 
conflict is neither defused, nor resolved, but simply denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 John Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (Harvard Business School Press 1993).  
3 Claude Didry and Annette Jobert, ‘Deliberation: a New Dimension in European Industrial Relations’, in Jean 
De Munck and others, Renewing Democratic Deliberation in Europe, The Challenge of Social and Civil Dialogue 
(Peter Lang 2012) 171, 171.  
4 From the Eurofound website, <www.eurofound.europa.eu/>, accessed 12 October 2012.  
5 The point is made also by Ruth Dukes and Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘Habermas and the European Social 
Dialogue: Deliberative Democracy as Industrial Democracy?’(2012) 18(4) Industrial LJ 21.  
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Table I 
 
FRAMEWORK PARTICIPANTS MODE MEANS GOALS OUTCOME 
Collective 
bargaining 
Employers 
Workers 
State  
Rigid Industrial 
action  
Compromise Conflict 
defusal and 
deferral 
Civil dialogue All affected 
parties 
Flexible Deliberation Freely 
obtained 
consensus 
Conflict 
resolution 
Social dialogue Tripartite or  
Bipartite 
‘Soft’ Targeted 
deliberation 
Predetermined 
consensus 
Conflict 
denial 
 
 
2.1 The Theory – Jürgen Habermas 
 
The influence of Jürgen Habermas in democratic theory cannot be underestimated. His 
communicative model provides the testing ground and legitimisation tool for normative 
statements in a democratic context6. His co-originality theory of private and public 
autonomy, whereby rights and democracy are seen as reflexively underpinning each other, 
is in itself dependent on a working framework where discursive practices involve all 
participants under ideal speech conditions7. In these, the openness of the discourse 
guarantees a democratic outcome and the inclusiveness of the participation results in the 
development of what he calls the ‘social perspective of the first-person plural’8, in which all 
affected persons are given a stake in the result of the dialogue and at the same time, bind 
themselves to that result. Arguably, the bindingness of the result constitutes the 
problematic element in the model, being more prone to capture. However, in the case of 
industrial relations, where the expressed telos of bargaining between the social partners is 
defusal or deferral of the conflict by means of a binding agreement, this bindingness is 
organic to the system9, and it is other elements upon which one should concentrate the 
critical attention, and these are the procedural guarantees and the substantive rights within 
that procedural framework. Indeed, it is important to note that, in the context of industrial 
relations, it is crucial not to lose the capacity of the social partners to create binding 
agreements, and furthermore, not to lose the bargaining tools that allow that bindingness to 
be established (in the case of workers, the right to undertake industrial action).   
 
Habermas’ model of participatory democracy is predicated on three essential elements: an 
effective framework, equal speaking positions for all participants – effective participation – 
and openness of outcome. It is not the place here to comprehensively critique the viability of 
this model, when faced with the relentlessness of predetermined structures and their power 
to close down possibilities, which is at its strongest precisely in a functioning democratic 
framework, as counterintuitive as this might seem. Rather, this brief introduction to 
Habermas’ discursive practices theory serves to illustrate the convergence between this 
theory and the practice in the Swedish model of industrial relations. To my knowledge, this 
                                                 
6 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William 
Rehg tr, Polity Press 1996). Also, more recently, Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Ciaran 
Cronin tr, Polity Press 2008).  
7 ibid 118 ff, especially 122; also 106: ‘Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses’.  
8 ibid 92.  
9 As part of the recognition of the fact that the conflict is organic to the model, and therefore necessarily 
present.  
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convergence has not been noted before, which is particularly surprising given the 
contractual nature of his co-originality thesis10. On the contrary, the influence of his 
theories on the development of the European Social Dialogue (ESD) is evident and has 
received much attention11.  
 
2.2 The Practice at EU Level: The European Social Dialogue 
 
The history of the creation of ‘social Europe’ as a project in parallel to ‘economic Europe’ 
has been interpreted as an exemplification of Karl Polanyi’s ‘social embeddedness theory’, 
whereby ‘the initial decoupling of the economic from the social economic constitution in the 
design of the integration project and the later strive for competitiveness through the 
“completion” of the internal market programme can be interpreted as disembedding moves 
[which] …. provoke countermoves directed at a re-embedding of the market’12.  
 
Others have remarked on the ‘dysfunctional relationship’ between the European Social 
Model and the Single Market project13; regardless of how ownership of the social is 
interpreted (as an internal move by the market to pre-empt disruption, or as a genuine 
countermove, still subject to the risk of appropriation by the market), the development of 
the European Social Dialogue took place precisely when the social model and the market 
model came to confront each other in what seemed like a case of binary and irreversible 
choice.   
 
It was at the Val Duchesse talks, organised by the Delors Commission in 1985, that the ESD 
between employers and trade unions was launched, under the auspices of the Commission14. 
Shortly thereafter, the ESD was given statutory presence by art 21 of the Single European 
Act15, which amended the EEC Treaty via the addition of art 118(a) and 118(b). Art 118(a) 
established the possibility of adopting directives by Qualified Majority Voting16; art 118(b) 
recited as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
10 As explicitly stated by Habermas (n 6) 122, referring to ‘[…] a horizontal association of free and equal 
persons […] prior to any legally organized state authority from whose encroachments citizens would have to 
protect themselves.’ 
11 An interesting theoretical approach to ESD, especially in light of the well known controversy between 
Habermas and Luhmann on societal structures (which started following their joint work in Niklas Luhmann 
and Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Society or Social Technology: What Does Systems Research Accomplish? [Suhrkamp 
1971] ) is by Christian Welz, The European Social Dialogue under Article 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty (Kluwer 
Law International 2008). In it, Welz adopts Luhmann’s and Teubner’s theories in order to argue for ESD to 
be understood as an autopoietic subsystem of the European Union.  
12 Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, ‘On De-formalisation in European Politics and Formalism in European 
Jurisprudence in Response to the “Social Deficit” of the European Integration Project – Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, (2008) 4(1) Hanse Law Review 3; the reference is obviously to Karl 
Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 
1944). 
13 John Foster, ‘The Single Market and Employment Rights: From a Dysfunctional to an Abusive 
Relationship?’, Institute of Employment Rights Conference, 21 March 2012, Developments in European Labour 
Law. Thanks to Professor Charles Woolfson for having brought this contribution to my attention. 
14 Information on the Val Duchesse process is available on Eurofound website <www.eurofound.europa.eu> 
accessed 12 October 2012.  
15 Single European Act [1987] OJ  L 169/1. 
16 ‘Article 118A (now Article 137(1) EC) was inserted by the Single European Act, which allowed for qualified 
majority voting for proposals ‘encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards 
the health and safety of workers’. From the Eurofound website <www.eurofound.europa.eu/> accessed 12 
October 2012.  
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The Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour 
at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based 
on agreement.  
 
The policy was expanded and embedded further in the Treaties with the Protocol on Social 
Policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty17, where the ESD is mentioned in art 1 
(programmatic article) and arts 3 and 4: 
 
Article 3 
1. The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation of management and 
labour at Community level and shall take any relevant measure to facilitate their dialogue by 
ensuring balanced support for the parties. 
2. To this end, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission 
shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of Community action. 
3. If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Community action advisable, it shall 
consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal. Management and 
labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, where appropriate, a 
recommendation. 
4. On the occasion of such consultation, management and labour may inform the 
Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 4. The duration of 
the procedure shall not exceed nine months, unless the management and labour concerned 
and the Commission decide jointly to extend it. 
 
Article 4 
1. Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level 
may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 
2. Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States 
or, in matters covered by Article 2, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council 
decision on a proposal from the Commission. 
The Council shall act by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question contains 
one or more provisions relating to one of the areas referred to in Article 2(3), in which case 
it shall act unanimously. 
 
These arts became incorporated in the EC Treaty as arts 138 and 13918 and are now arts 
154 and 155 TFEU19.  
 
Since its inception in 1985, the ESD has created a substantial amount of literature dedicated 
both to its initiatives, including its successes and failures, and to critical reflections and 
analysis, both country-specific and more general in approach20. Issues of process and result 
intersect with domestic patterns of industrial relations, raising several questions: what is 
ESD for, and how is it supposed to interact with national models? Are we confronted with 
substitution, where ESD comes to replace industrial relations conducted at the domestic 
level, or validate them at the European level, or something else? This article is premised on 
the assumption that the Swedish model of industrial relations successfully accomplishes 
what Habermas envisioned as the function of discursive practices in guaranteeing a 
                                                 
17 Treaty on European Union Protocol on Social Policy [1992] OJ C191/1. 
18 Treaty Establishing the European Community [2006] OJ C321 E/5.  
19 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/49.  
20 The output is considerable: ‘institutional’ information is available from several EU websites, such as 
<www.eurofound.europa.eu>, and <http://ec.europa.eu> accessed 12 October 2012; a recent study by the 
Policy Department of the DG for Internal Policies was published in 2011, Cross-border Collective Bargaining and 
Transnational Social Dialogue, IP/A/EMPL/ST/2010-06; see also Welz (n 12) and Jean De Munck and others 
(n 3).  
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democratic outcome in the shadow of the law. The assumption holds, one would like to 
think, if there is a balance between the democratic nature of the discursive practices and the 
framing and the binding provided by the law. Crucial for this balance is that the discursive 
practices cannot just be a procedural value, but have to have substantive content, and that 
this has to be reflexively present at practice level: in other words, the social partners have to 
have the power to determine the content of the binding rules, and they have to be aware of 
this power21. For now, it will suffice to note that, with all its limitations, in the Swedish 
model this substantive reflexive power is conferred on the social partners.  
 
3. THE SWEDISH SOCIAL MODEL 
 
The Swedish model of industrial relations is based on a collective agreements framework 
with a robust procedural structure and extensive powers granted to the social partners to 
come to collective decisions as to their substantive rights and obligations under private law 
contracts, with minimal legislative involvement22. The telos of this model is exemplified by 
the absence of a law on minimum wage in Sweden, since the rate of pay is agreed within the 
collective agreements negotiated by the employers and trade unions at the sectoral level. 
The main statutory provisions are contained in the 1974 Employment Protection Act (LAS) 
and the 1976 Co-determination Act (MBL)23, and include the obligation to maintain 
‘industrial peace’ when a collective agreement is entered into (s 41 MBL). These pieces of 
1970s legislation have been seen as an attempt to crystallise in statutory form (and 
therefore constitutionalise) certain substantive and procedural advantages for unions, while 
maintaining the traditional system of collective negotiated agreements24. Collective 
agreements are applicable to trade union members directly (in Sweden about 70% of 
workers belong to a trade union and 90% of working relationships are covered by a 
collective agreement25) and indirectly through subsidiary agreements to non-unionised 
workers and employees. Additionally, the social partners enter into basic agreements 
establishing the procedural rules to be followed in the negotiations; these are modelled on 
the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, signed in 1938 between the then Swedish Employers’ Association 
and the largest Swedish Trade Union Confederation, LO, and still applicable to most 
negotiated agreements. The law gives the trade unions exclusive powers to conclude 
                                                 
21 I am here conflating authorship, as intended by Habermas (n 6) 120, and power in the sense of creative 
legislative power.  
22 For a historical review, see Ole Hasselbach, ‘The Roots – the History of Nordic Labour Law’, (2002) 43 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 11.   
23 The Lag om Anställningsskydd (Official Gazette 1982:80) and the Medbestämmandelagen (Official Gazette 
1976:580). 
24 Hasselbalch (n 23) 32. A divergent look at the history of social relations in Sweden by Svante Nycander, 
with more emphasis placed on the shift from a model of ‘collective laissez faire’ as described by Otto Kahn-
Freund (who believed Sweden to be the most accomplished example of this model), accompanied by the ‘spirit 
of Saltsjöbaden’, to a much more interventionist and State-led policy, exemplified by the legislative activity of 
the 1970s. See Svante Nycander, ‘Misunderstanding the Swedish Model’, in Collective Bargaining, 
Discrimination, Social Security and European Integration: Papers & Proceedings of the 7th European Regional Congress 
of the International Society for Labour Law and Social Security Law, Stockholm, September 2002 (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 437. 
25 As sources for the data, see The Swedish Model – The Importance of Collective Agreements in Sweden, leaflet 
produced by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) <www.lo.se> accessed 12 October 2012; and the 
Report produced by the Swedish Government,  Action in Response to the Laval Judgment – Summary, Swedish 
Government Official Reports, SOU 2008:123. The coverage for the building sector is even higher, with 
collective agreements covering 96% of workers, of which 77% belonged to a trade union. All data refer to the 
year 2007. However reassuring or frankly enviable these numbers might seem from a UK perspective, there 
has been a downward trend, from a high of 85% in the early 1990s to the current numbers, as reported by 
Charles Woolfson, Christer Thörnqvist and Jeffrey Sommers, “The Swedish Model and the Future of Labour 
Standards after Laval’, (2010) 41(4) Industrial Relations J 333. 
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agreements and a powerful negotiating tool in the constitutional protection granted to the 
right to engage in industrial action26. Once an agreement is reached, there is, as noted, an 
obligation on the parties to a social truce. This obligation is given statutory strength in 
Section 42 MBL:  
 
Employers’ or workers’ associations shall not be entitled to organise or encourage illegal 
collective action in any way whatsoever. Nor shall they be entitled to participate in any 
illegal collective action by providing support or in any other way. An association which is 
itself bound by a collective agreement shall also, in the event of a collective action which its 
members are preparing to take or are taking, seek to prevent such action or help to bring it 
to an end.  
If any illegal action is taken, third parties shall be prohibited from participating in it. 
 
The Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) interpreted para 1 of Section 42 to apply also to 
industrial action taken in Sweden against foreign undertakings; the judgment27 concerned a 
company that owned a ship, M/S Britannia, flying a flag of convenience and employing a 
Filipino crew covered by a collective agreement under Filipino law; the interpretation 
became known as the Britannia Principle. As a consequence of this judgment, the Swedish 
government immediately approved a legislative amendment to the MBL28, adding three 
paragraphs, including a third paragraph to Section 42, to the effect that: ‘The provisions of 
the first two sentences of the first paragraph shall apply only if an association takes 
collective action by reason of the terms and conditions of employment falling directly within 
the scope of the present law’29. The amendment excluded industrial action against 
employers having concluded agreements out with Swedish law, effectively allowing 
industrial action against foreign employers and employers of posted workers covered by 
collective agreements under the home state law. The amendments became in turn known as 
Lex Britannia, devised by the Swedish parliament as a way to counter the risk of social 
dumping30. This is the same stated purpose of the Posted Workers Directive31: the crucial 
difference is that, in the Swedish model, the social partners, and specifically, the trade 
                                                 
26 Ch 2, s 17 of the Swedish Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, the Swedish Constitution): ‘A trade 
union or an employer or employers’ association shall be entitled to take industrial action unless otherwise 
provided in an Act of law or under an agreement’; the Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen), which acts as a 
court of last instance for industrial disputes (except where the Court sentence is alleged to be a grave 
violations of fundamental rights and where recourse to the Constitutional  Court might be allowed), has 
interpreted this provision to apply horizontally and to entail civil liability (civilrättslig verkan). Constitutional 
protection for trade union rights, including the right to industrial action, is not unusual in Europe, as noted by 
AG Mengozzi in his Laval Opinion, paras 31-33. 
27 Britannia Case AD 1989, No 120.  
28 Official Gazette 1991:681, Government Bill 1990/91: 162.  
29 The other two amendments stipulate that a foreign collective agreement that is invalid under foreign law is 
valid under Swedish law if it complies with the MBL (s 25a) and that later collective agreements will trump an 
earlier collective agreement that does not comply with the MBL (s 31a). 
30 As stated in the Government Bill, 5ff.; of particular relevance, in light of the proportionality analysis 
performed by the ECJ to the detriment of the collective right of industrial action against the individual right of 
provision of services, the report stated that: ‘This regulation [lex Britannia] is based on the idea that 
employment relationships which in no way fall within the scope of the MBL, cannot, reciprocally, be given the 
special protection it provides. The starting point must be, rather, the constitutional rules on the freedom and the right 
to take industrial action’ [emphasis added]. See also Ronnie Eklund, ‘A Swedish Perspective on Laval’, (2008) 29 
Comparative Labour L and Policy J 551, 554. Social dumping can be defined as ‘[the] practice involving the 
export of goods from a country with weak or poorly enforced labour standards, where the exporter’s costs are 
artificially lower than its competitors in countries with higher standards, hence representing an unfair 
advantage in international trade.’ (Eurofound website <www.eurofound.europa.eu> accessed 12 October 
2012). 
31 See Preamble of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
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unions, are entrusted with the tools necessary to avoid social dumping and maintain fair 
competition in the Swedish labour market.   
 
4. THE LAVAL CASE 
 
4.1 The Facts 
 
The facts of the case are well known. Laval un Partneri Ltd (Laval) won a contract for the 
renovation of a school in Vaxholm, Sweden, through its fully owned Swedish subsidiary 
L&P Baltic Bygg AB (Baltic). Between May and December 2004, Laval posted 35 Latvian 
workers to work on the project. In June 2004, Byggettan32 started negotiations with Laval 
and Baltic with the intention of entering into a collective agreement for the posted workers. 
Following the beginning of negotiations, Laval entered into an agreement with all its 
posted workers33. In November 2004, with the negotiations stalling, Byggettan started 
industrial action against Laval, by blockading the construction site. In December 2004 a 
conciliation hearing was held at the Arbetsdomstolen, in which Laval refused a final offer by 
Byggettan and requested an interim injunction to stop the industrial action, claiming that it 
was in violation of arts 12 and 49 EC. The request was refused by the Arbetsdomstolen on 22 
December 2004. The hearing on the merits took place on 11 March 2005; in it, Laval 
petitioned the Arbetsdomstolen to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of 
Justice (the “ECJ” or “the Court”) under art 234 EC, in addition to demanding damages from 
Byggnads and Elektrikerna for a total of SEK 600,00034.    
 
4.2 The Law 
 
The Swedish legislative framework has been reviewed in Part 3; this section contains a 
review of the EU and international law applicable to the decision by the Court. The 
necessary historical background to the applicability of EU legislation to Swedish labour 
disputes is certainly the position that Sweden took with respect to its own model of social 
relations when negotiating its accession to the EC in 1994. At the time, Sweden appended a 
declaration to its accession protocol, to the effect that ‘In an exchange of letters between the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the Commission, […] the Kingdom of Sweden received assurances 
with regard to Swedish practice in labour market matters and notably the system of 
determining condition of work in collective agreements between the social partners’35. 
Equally, the Lex Britannia already discussed in pt 3 engendered a reaction at the 
international level, following the Swedish employers’ organisation’s claim that this law 
breached ILO’s Conventions C.87, C.98 and P.14736. This claim was rejected both by the 
Swedish government at the time and eventually by the ILO Committee of Experts 
                                                 
32 The three unions involved in the case were Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (the Swedish building and 
public works trade union, “Byggnads”); Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet avdelning1, Byggettan (the local 
branch of Byggnads, “Byggettan”); and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (the Swedish electricians’ trade union, 
“Elektrikerna”) 
33 Byggnads claimed that this agreement was no more than ‘a device for the Company to try to avoid signing a 
Swedish collective agreement’ (Arbetsdomstolen Judgment no. 49/05, Case no A268/04, Byggnads’ submission 
to the Court). 
34 55,000 GBP at July 2012 exchange rate. 
35 Declaration No. 46 by the Kingdom of Sweden on social policy, annexed to the Accession Act of Austria, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, OJ C241, 29.8.1994.  
36 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (adopted 9 July 1948, entered into force 4 
July 1950) 68 UNTS 18; Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (adopted 1 July 1949, entered into force 
18 July 1951) 96 UNTS 258; and Protocol of 1996 to the Minimum Standards of Merchant Shipping 
Convention (adopted 22 October 1996, entered into force 10 January 2003) 2206 UNTS 106. 
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(CEACR)37; consequently, the ILO reaffirmed the compliance of Swedish labour legislation 
with internationally-agreed standards.  
 
The ‘Posted Workers Directive’ was adopted by the Social Affairs Council on 24 September 
1996 with the contrary vote of only Portugal and the UK38; the Swedish parliament adopted 
the relevant implementing legislation in May 1999, to the exclusion of collective 
agreements on pay, as per domestic labour policy39. Specifically, Section 5 of the Act 
contains the provisions on the conditions of employment, as per art 3(1) of the Directive, 
which covers the minimum rates of pay at 3(1)(c).  
 
In a way, the Directive departs from the international private law rules on the applicability 
of employment contracts for temporarily deployed workers as stipulated in art 6 of the 1980 
Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations40, which states that the 
laws of the country of origin (home country) apply to the employment relationship41. 
Instead, in order to avoid social dumping and guarantee fair competition in the labour 
market, the Directive adopts the device of a ‘core’ of labour guarantees (‘a nucleus of 
mandatory rules for minimum protection’), listed at art 3, as ‘laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreement or arbitration awards which 
have been declared universally applicable’. According to para 8 of the article, this refers to 
‘collective agreements or arbitration awards which must be observed by all undertakings in 
the geographical area and in the profession of industry concerned’. Where there is no 
system for collective agreements of universal application (as is the case in Sweden) the 
Directive allows for ‘collective agreements or arbitration awards which are generally 
applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned, and/or collective agreements which have been concluded by the most 
representative employers’ and labour organizations at national level and which are applied 
throughout national territory’, with the proviso that their application will guarantee equal 
treatment to the undertakings involved.  
 
The Directive was not applicable to the dispute between Laval and the three trade unions, 
as a consequence of the fact that Directives do not have horizontal direct effect and so 
cannot be relied upon in a dispute between private parties or create rights and obligations 
directly enforceable by national courts or by the ECJ42. However, this does not prevent the 
                                                 
37 The complaint was initiated by Swedish representative for employers Johan von Holten at the ILO 
conference in 1991; the complaint was rejected both by the Swedish government, which distanced itself from 
it, and by the CEACR; the information is taken from the LO website, 
<www.lo.se/home/lo/home.nsf/unidView/.../$file/waxholm.pdf> accessed 12 October 2012.  
38 (n 32) Since the Directive was adopted according to Qualified Majority Procedure under art189b EC, there 
was no power of veto available to the UK and Portugal. The choice of legal base, current arts 53 and 62 
TFEU, was made precisely to avoid the necessity of a unanimous vote in the Council; see Paul Davies, ‘Posted 
Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems’ (1997) 34 Common Market L Rev 
571.  
39 Act on the Posting of Workers, Official Gazette 1999:678, Government Bill 1998/99:90.   
40 Council 80/934/EEC: Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in 
Rome on 19 June 1980 / Consolidated version CF 498Y0126(03), OJ L266/1.  
41 As noted also by Advocate General Mengozzi in his Laval Opinion, para 132[which case????]. Conversely, 
the ECJ had already established in Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Limitada v Office National d’Immigration 
[1990] ECR I-1417, that ‘Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, 
or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even 
temporarily, within their territory [...]’.  
42 The applicability of dirs is not as clear cut as the general rule seems to imply; the ECJ has pronounced 
numerous times on their effect; see mainly Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; Case 148/78 
Pubblico Ministero v Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629; Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891; Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
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Court from taking directives into consideration when examining a case, and this the Court 
did do extensively in its Judgment, nor does it exempt national courts from interpreting 
their national laws in conformity with EU law, including Directives, therefore ensuring 
their indirect effect.  
 
Laval argued that the MBL, and specifically Section 42(3), was in breach of EU law by 
discriminating against foreign undertakings and by unlawfully violating the freedom to 
provide services protected under art 49 EC. Both in the case of the Directive and in the case 
of art 49, restrictions are allowed either for public policy reasons, or for the protection of a 
legitimate interest. In both cases, the Court did not accept that the right to engage in 
collective bargaining between private parties could be affected by a public policy exception, 
because of the lack of involvement of the State in the Swedish model of industrial 
relations43; nor did they accept that the protection of legitimate interests justified the 
restrictions imposed by the MBL on the freedom to provide services, judging it 
disproportionate to attain its scope. The Court set the bar extremely low in its standard of 
review of the proportionality of the action, by stating that, 
 
 ‘[...] the right of trade unions [...] to take collective action [....] is liable to make it less 
attractive, or more difficult, for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, 
and therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the 
meaning of Article 49 EC’ [emphasis added]44. 
 
5. THE DECISION OF THE COURT 
 
5.1 The Background  
 
The background to the Judgment of the Court is crucial to understanding its outcome. 
Three elements are worth mentioning: the decision of the Arbetsdomstolen to request a 
preliminary ruling; the opinion given by Advocate General Mengozzi45; and the judgment 
issued by the ECJ only one week previously in Viking46. 
  
Laval had claimed in its submission to the Arbetsdomstolen that the industrial action was 
unlawful under Section 42(1) of the MBL; additionally, it had claimed that Section 42(3) (the 
Lex Britannia amendment) constituted a violation of the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, protected under art 12 EC, and of the freedom to provide services 
under art 49 EC and to post workers under the Posted Workers Directive. For its part, 
Byggnads claimed that, since the right to take industrial action is not regulated at 
Community level47, national governments retained competence in this area, as reiterated in 
Recital 22 of the Posted Workers Directive. Without prejudice to this, they also claimed 
that restrictions of art 49 can be justified if undertaken in the public interest (such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 723; Case C–188/89 Foster and Others v British Gas plc [1990] ECR1-3313; 
Case C–106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 1-4135; Case C–
201/02 The Queen, on the application of Delena Wells v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions [2004] ECR 1- 723; Cases C–397–403/01 Pfeiffer and Others v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Waldshut eV [2004] ECR 1-8835. 
43 Laval, para 84.  
44 On the application of proportionality in the context of collective bargaining, see Brian Bercusson, ‘The 
Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’ (2007) 13(3) Eur L J 279, 304.  
45 Delivered on 23 May 2007. 
46 The two cases were joined and the judgment on Viking was issued on 11 December 2007. 
47 As expressly stated in art 137(5) EC. 
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measures taken for the protection of employees and to avoid social dumping)48. The union 
claimed that Laval workers had been paid SEK 20-35 per hour and made to work 56 hours 
per week, in contrast with the union’s request of an hourly wage of SEK 145, with a fall-
back rate of SEK 109 in case of lack of agreement by the parties49.  
 
The Arbetsdomstolen accepted that the industrial action undertaken by Byggnads was 
unlawful under Section 42(1) of the MBL; it held however that, Section 42(3) of the same 
Act being applicable, the industrial action was therefore lawful under Swedish law. On the 
question of Community law, it accepted the request of a preliminary ruling from the ECJ 
advanced by the Company in order to clarify the lawfulness of the industrial action under 
arts 12 and 49 EC and under the Posted Workers Directive. The Company had argued that 
the Court had competence, notwithstanding art 137(5) EC, to decide the dispute insofar as, 
first, the industrial action constituted a disproportionate and unlawful restriction of a 
fundamental freedom and, second, when national law is in conflict with Community law, the 
latter one takes precedence. 
 
The Arbetsdomstolen therefore referred the dispute to the ECJ, seeking clarification on the 
following two points: ‘the issue of the compatibility of the industrial action with the rules on 
free movement of services and the prohibition against discrimination on the ground of 
nationality; and, ‘the conditions under which legal rules which in practice discriminate 
against foreign companies carrying out activities temporarily in Sweden  with labour from 
their own country [lex Britannia], are compatible with the rules on free movement of 
services and prohibition against discrimination on grounds of nationality.’  
 
Subsequent to the request for the preliminary ruling, Advocate General (AG) Paolo 
Mengozzi delivered his Opinion on 23 May 2007. This is not analysed in detail in this 
article; it is worth noting however that markedly different approach taken by the AG in his 
analysis of the Swedish model of industrial relations and the weight that this is attributed in 
drafting the Opinion. To this effect, it will suffice to provide two quotes: the first one is from 
para 61 of the Opinion, in the Preliminary Observations (Legal Analysis section), where AG 
Mengozzi states that: 
 
... if the application of the freedoms of movement provided for by the Treaty, in this case the 
freedom to provide services, were to undermine the very substance of the right to resort to 
collective action, which is protected as a fundamental right, such application might be 
regarded as unlawful, even if it pursued an objective in the general interest. 
 
It is clear from this quote that AG Mengozzi does not take as his starting point the 
presumption that the right to collective action is to be intended as a possible restriction to a 
fundamental freedom, and therefore has to be proportionate in order to be lawful, which is 
the approach taken by the Court. Rather, he opines that the fundamental right against 
which possible restrictions have to be assessed for proportionality is the collective right to 
industrial action. The approach of the Court is of course dictated by the case as presented, 
since the Court is asked by the claimant to decide on a breach of the freedom protected in 
art 49; however it is noticeable that AG Mengozzi seems to at least entertain a possible 
categorical approach  to the question posed, where the right to industrial action is found to 
                                                 
48 As established by the ECJ in Case C-164/99 R. v. Portugaia Construções Limitada [2002] ECR I-787, para 
19. 
49 According to interviews granted under condition of anonymity by Laval workers and published by 
Byggnadsarbetaren magazine <www.byggnadsarbetaren.se/> accessed 12 October 2012.  
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fall ‘outside the scope of the freedoms of movement’50, rather than the balancing approach  
used by the ECJ, where inevitably one of the two rights is seen to cut into the other one and 
the role of the Court is to assess the proportionality of this infringement. 
  
It is well known that AG Mengozzi concluded that art 49 did not preclude industrial action 
to force a foreign employer to accept a collective agreement guaranteeing better conditions 
for the posted workers, provided the collective action was motivated by public interest goals 
(inclusive of the prevention of social dumping). I would like to point out another aspect of 
his Opinion, and specifically his more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the 
Swedish social model, as exemplified by para 260: 
 
However, those circumstances [unforeseeable results when entering the negotiations, or 
excessive wage claims] are inherent in a system of collective employment relations which is 
based on and favours negotiation between both sides of industry and, therefore, contractual 
freedom, rather than intervention by the national legislature [emphasis added]. I do not 
think that, at its present stage of development, Community law can encroach upon that 
approach to employment relationships through the application of one of the fundamental 
freedoms of movement provided for in the Treaty. 
 
It is my argument, and I am not alone in this, that this encroachment was precisely the 
strategic decision undertaken by the Court and further, that in order to execute this 
strategy, the Court had to wilfully disregard that very system of social relations even while 
upholding the rhetoric of social dialogue51. 
 
Finally, the Laval Judgment has to be read in the context of the developing jurisprudence of 
the Court on the right of collective action, and specifically, Viking. As stated in the 
Introduction, it is not my intention to compare the two cases52, and even less, to use them as 
symbols. But it is nonetheless important to note that the Court did overstep its own mark in 
delivering the Laval Judgment, by arrogating to itself the task of establishing the 
proportionality of the interference with the fundamental freedom involved, a task that it had 
left to the national court in Viking53. 
 
5.2 The Judgment of the Court 
 
Many elements of the Laval Judgment have created a considerable amount of debate. To 
start from where we ended in the previous section, the proportionality analysis performed 
by the Court has been criticised, as downgrading the fundamental right of collective action 
and representation to the exercise of the freedom of movement protected by the Treaty54. 
                                                 
50 Para 60. This categorical approach is ultimately rejected in favour of a balancing exercise, paras 78ff of the 
Opinion.  
51 See for example para 105 of the Judgment. 
52 Both cases have been analysed extensively, including by way of comparison; see Joerges and Rödl (n12); 
Alain Supiot, ‘L’Europe gagnée par « l’économie communiste de marché’ Revue du MAUSS permanente (30 
janvier 2008), <www.journaldumauss.net/spip.php?article283> accessed 12 October 2012; Norbert Reich, 
‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ (2008) 
9(2) German Law Journal 125; Rebecca Zahn, ‘The Viking and Laval Cases in the Context of European 
Enlargement’ (2008) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issue3/zahn3.html> accessed 12 October 2012; Roger Blanpain and Andrzej 
Świątkowski (eds.) The Laval and Viking Cases : Freedom of Services and Establishment v. Industrial Conflict in the 
European Economic Area and Russia (Kluwer Law International 2009).      
53 At para 87 of its Judgment, the Court stated: ‘As regards the question of whether or not the collective action 
at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the object pursued, it is for the 
national court to examine…’ 
54 See for example Bercusson (n 43).  
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Equally, the horizontal application of art 49, and the consequent liability of the trade unions 
for breaches of EU law, has been investigated extensively. Laval, Viking, Rüffert and 
Luxembourg have been taken as an authoritative view of the Court on the status of 
fundamental rights, at least pre-Lisbon, against the four freedoms, and the exemplification 
of the economic model defended by the Court against social policies, at the European and 
national level.  
 
This article is investigating the significance of this Judgment through the prism of the 
discourse of social dialogue at the European level, and how this interacts and cuts across 
national policies on industrial relations, taking the example of the Swedish system as the 
one that the Court itself adjudicates upon. To this effect, particular attention will be paid to 
the language adopted by the Court in explaining the rationale for its decision. A couple of 
preliminary points need to be made: the first one is the determination of the Court to focus 
its analysis on the interpretation of the Directive on Posted Workers, which could not be 
relied upon by Laval in its claim in the Swedish courts. This approach has been ‘puzzling’ 
for many authors, but explained by the wish of the Court to ‘express its views on the role 
and interpretation of the Directive’55; arguably, more is at play here, because effectively, the 
Directive is used to give substance to the general principle protected by art 49 (freedom to 
provide services). Second, it has been suggested that the Court transformed the ‘floor’ 
provided by the Directive in its nucleus of minimum requirements to a ‘ceiling’ by making 
them into the maximum standards instead56; to this, it is important to add that this is 
accomplished by effectively tying the principle of freedom of establishment to the specific 
criteria listed in the Directive, even while defending in principle the sovereign right of 
States to apply more generous criteria.  
 
The very framing of the Court’s decision to the exclusion of any meaningful engagement 
with the particularity of the Swedish system of industrial relations is evident by the way in 
which the Court rearticulates the first question posed by the Arbetsdomstolen wilfully 
changing its scope57. The Arbetsdomstolen had posed the question in these terms: 
 
Is it compatible with EU rules […] for trade unions to attempt, by means of collective 
action, to force a foreign provider of services to sign a collective agreement in the host 
country […] if the legislation to implement Directive 96/71 has no express provisions 
concerning the application of terms and conditions of employment in collective 
agreements?’58  
 
The Court rephrased the question as follows: 
 
The national court’s first question must be understood as asking […] whether Articles 12 
EC and 49 EC, and Directive 96/71, are to be interpreted as precluding a trade union […] 
from attempting, by means of collective action in the form of blockading sites […] to force a 
provider of services established in another Member State to enter into negotiations with it 
on the rates of pay for posted workers, and to sign a collective agreement, the terms of 
which lay down [….] more favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant 
legislative provisions….’59.  
                                                 
55 ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’, (2008) 37(2) 
Industrial Law Journal 126, 127.  
56 Study produced by the EU Parliament, Employment and Social Affairs Department, DG Internal Policies, 
‘The Impact of the ECJ Judgments on Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg on the Practice of Collective 
Bargaining and the Effectiveness of Social Action’, IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-11 (May 2010) 7.   
57 As Joergens and Rödl (n12), put it at 16, n 61, ‘The Court simply ignores Swedish policy’.  
58 Laval, para 41.  
59 Laval, para 53.  
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With this reframing, the Court shifts the focus of the question from the issue of non-
discrimination, to that of the freedom to provide services unencumbered by national 
legislation protective of social rights. 
  
When adopting the implementing legislation for the Posted Workers Directive, the 
Swedish government had dealt with the requirement of art 3(1) of the Directive not by 
means of collective agreements applicable erga omnes but through the possibility provided by 
art 3(8)(2), justifying its approach in the following terms:  
 
Legislating to require posting employers to comply with the applicable collective agreement 
without creating discrimination against them as compared to Swedish employers who are 
not required by law so to do would mean that there is actually only way to avoid a 
declaration of the universal applicability of collective agreements.  That is for the legal text 
to have approximately the same wording as the Directive, namely that posting employers 
must comply with collective agreements to the same extent that Swedish companies in a 
similar situation do. This would entail always needing to make a comparison of each 
individual case. Such a solution would obviously seem alien to the Swedish tradition60. 
 
 In other words, the Posted Workers Directive and its implementation could not be used to 
determine two different categories of collective agreements under Swedish law, and this was 
the same rationale underpinning the Lex Britannia. However, the intention of the Court is to 
internationalise collective agreements, and at the same time to deprive the unions of their 
power to use industrial action as a negotiating tool for anything above the minimum level 
guaranteed by the Directive. And to do so, it rephrases the question so as to make its focus 
the more favourable conditions, rather than the technical issue raised by the Arbetsdomstolen 
with respect to the applicability of art 3(8) when the law of the host state does not allow for 
the applicability of collective agreements erga omnes.  
 
Once rephrased in the above fashion, it is not difficult for the Court to further its argument 
on the basis that forcing more favourable conditions is not allowed by the Directive, which 
only protects the voluntary decision by the social partners to enter into more favourable 
conditions of employment with respect to posted workers. This is a typical move, where the 
diversity of the speaking positions is masked by the apparent equality of choice. So the 
Court can state both that Recital 17 of the Directive holds, which states that ‘[…] the 
mandatory rules for minimum protection in force in the host country must not prevent the 
application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers’ – 
as well as Recital 22, ‘[…] this Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member 
States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and professions’ – and 
contextually decide that ‘Article 3(7) of Directive 96/7161 cannot be interpreted as allowing 
the host Member State to make the provision of services in its territory conditional on the 
observance of terms and conditions of employment which go beyond the mandatory rules 
for minimum protection’. It seems irrelevant to the Court that the Swedish system does 
nothing of the sort in its legislation, leaving the matter to the social partners62. This, it 
seems, is a freedom too far for the Court. What then remains of the right of industrial action 
if it can be exercised only to obtain the observance of the minimum standards already 
guaranteed by the Directive or through its mechanisms?  
                                                 
60 As cited by the Arbetsdomstolen in its Judgment (n 33) 31.  
61 Which states that ‘[p]aragraphs 1 to 6 [on minimum requirements] shall not prevent application of terms 
and conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers.’ 
62 With the proviso that the horizontal application of the acquis might require the social partners to be subject 
to the same rules tying Member States. 
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After effectively depriving the right of collective action of its main function, the Court 
moves on to question more widely the Swedish system of social dialogue. Let us remind 
ourselves that, in Habermasian terms, the equality of speaking positions is crucial, and the 
Court has already dispensed with that. Equally essential is the openness of outcome. AG 
Mengozzi had remarked, as we had seen, that this is a structural, physiological and 
unavoidable element of collective bargaining63. If the outcome is predetermined, what is the 
value of the dialogue? This framing condition depends organically on the ‘equality of arms’, 
in the sense that both social partners are equally exposed to the openness of the outcome: 
the worker as well as the employer enter into pay negotiations in Sweden without certainty 
of outcome, except two, very important provisos: the rate of pay is supposed to reflect the 
general rate of pay applicable for a similar job in the same geographical area, and, if an 
agreement is not reached, the fall-back rate will be applicable (which is probably lower than 
the employees wish to get and higher than the employers want to pay)64. In another blow to 
meaningful social dialogue, the Court asserts that:  
 
‘[…] collective action […] cannot be justified in the light of the public interest objective 
[…] where the negotiations on pay […] form part of a national context characterised by a 
lack of provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not 
render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to determine 
the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards minimum pay[emphasis 
added]’.  
 
Apart from being a misrepresentation of the Swedish model, because of the two conditions 
outlined above on pay negotiations, one cannot help but despair for the complete and wilful 
misunderstanding of bargaining and dialogue in conditions of democracy. The openness is 
the virtue of the system, not its vice65.  
 
And so on to the third element of an effective social dialogue in Habermasian terms, the 
framework for the dialogue to take place under conditions of equality (procedural equality, 
as opposed to the substantive equality of speaking positions discussed above). With this, in 
its answer to the second question posed by the Arbetsdomstolen, the Court returns to the 
issue of discrimination. The framing for social dialogue is in Sweden guaranteed by the 
MBL, in its post-lex Britannia incarnation, designed to guarantee an equal framework for 
domestic and foreign undertakings with respect to the right to engage in industrial action. 
 The Court however interprets this rule to the effect that ‘collective action is authorised 
against undertakings bound by a collective agreement subject to the law of another Member 
State in the same way as such action is authorised against undertakings which are not 
bound by any collective agreement’66 and finds consequently the rule to be unjustly 
discriminatory (by equating domestic undertakings that have not entered into a collective 
                                                 
63 Para 260 of his Opinion.  
64 Eklund (n 30) 552.  
65 ibid 551. By doing so the Court is exposing, maybe unwittingly, the hypocrisy of the rhetoric of ‘flexicurity’ 
at EU level; see for example, Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: more and better jobs through flexibility and 
security - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, adopted on 27 June 2007, COM (2007) 
359. Flexicurity, for the Commission, has to include ‘flexible and reliable contractual arrangements’ (at 20); 
without irony, the documents notes that: ‘Active involvement of social partners is key to ensure that 
flexicurity delivers benefits for all. It is also essential that all stakeholders involved are prepared to accept and 
take responsibility for change. Integrated flexicurity policies are often found in countries where the dialogue – 
and above all the trust - between social partners, and between social partners and public authorities, has 
played an important role’ (at 18).  
66 Para 113. 
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agreement with foreign undertakings covered by a foreign collective agreement). This is 
only half the story; as we know from amended Sections 42(3), 25(a) and 31(a) MBL, the rule 
only applies to collective agreements that violate the MBL. In any case, the Arbetsdomstolen 
clearly stated that ‘the industrial action would have been lawful if the Company had been a 
Swedish company’ so that it is neither a question of ‘circumvention’ nor of ‘special 
treatment’. Furthermore, the Arbetsdomstolen clarifies the scope of the MBL amendment to 
the effect that, since the MBL guarantees a ‘social truce’ under conditions of respect of the 
legislation, this privilege cannot be extended to foreign undertakings that do not otherwise 
respect its provisions. In other words, the Court subverts the very rationale of Section 42 
MBL, to guarantee social peace provided negotiations are entered in good faith and within 
the umbrella (the procedural framing) of the MBL, into a prohibition to engage in industrial 
action. Stripped of the crucial framing, all that remains, for the Court, is the prohibition to 
strike once a collective agreement (any collective agreement) is entered into67. So set adrift 
from its supporting legislation, the prohibition stands in for the opposite of what it was 
intended to be, i.e., a consequence of the collective agreement binding in compliance with 
Swedish law, not a free-standing right to be protected from industrial action and from any 
duty to engage in social dialogue.   
 
6. THE AFTERMATH 
 
The Laval Judgment’s repercussions were felt at the political level in Sweden, with new 
legislation being passed; at the domestic legal level, with the Judgment by the 
Arbetsdomstolen68; and finally at the EU level, with negotiations on an amended directive on 
the posting of workers and the initiation of a complaint procedure by the LO and the 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (“TCO”) against Sweden to the European 
Committee of Social Rights69.   
 
As a consequence of the Judgment of the Court, a Committee was appointed by the Swedish 
government in 2008 [at the time, a centre-right coalition] in order to ascertain what 
legislative action should be taken, in the form of amendments to the Lex Britannia and the 
Posting of Workers Act; in its report, the Committee clarified the provisions of art 3(8)(2) 
indent one, whereby, in the absence of erga omnes application of collective agreements or 
arbitration awards, ‘Member States may […] base themselves on collective agreements or 
arbitration awards which are generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned […]’. As for the necessary 
compliance with art 49, the report suggested that the right to strike in order to determine 
the employment conditions of posted workers could be retained under the following 
conditions: the disputed terms and conditions of employment must correspond to the 
conditions contained in a collective agreement which complies with art 3(8)(2); the terms 
and conditions must ‘[fall] within the “hard core” of the Posting of Workers Directive’ 
(with the proviso that, as concerns minimum rates of pay, it should be left to the trade 
unions to determine what constitutes said rate, to the inclusion of overtime etc.); the burden 
of proof that the condition of employment of the posted workers are equivalent to the 
                                                 
67 This is apparently the rational underlying the new Lex Laval, see below.  
68 For the domestic repercussions, see in general Mia Rönnmar, ‘Laval returns to Sweden: The Final Judgment 
of the Swedish Labour Court and Swedish Legislative Reforms’ (2010) 39(3) Industrial Law Journal 280; for a 
very good , and critical, review of the Labour Court’s judgment in light of EU law, see Elisa Saccà, ‘Nuovi 
scenari nazionali del caso Laval. L’ordinamento svedese tra responsabilità per danno “da sciopero” e 
innovazioni legislative (indotte)’, Working Papers Centro Studi di Diritto del Lavoro Europeo “Massimo 
D’Antona” 86/2010.  
69 Complaint No. 85/2012, registered on 27 June 2012, available on the Committee’s website, 
<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/Complaints_en.asp> accessed 12 October 2012.  
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conditions demanded by the trade unions rests with the posting employer. Other procedural 
amendments were also proposed to improve transparency and communication, always 
respectful of the principle, at least on paper, that ‘the social partners will assume 
responsibility for [the] proposed regulations satisfying the requirements of Community 
law’70. The new Lex Laval, adopted on 15 April 2010 by the Swedish Parliament, in addition 
to accepting the proposals of the Commission, qualifies the right to resort to industrial 
action accordingly, by stating that ‘An employees’ organisation may not use industrial 
action to achieve a Swedish collective agreement if an employer can show that the 
employees are already included in terms and conditions (regardless if stipulated by 
collective agreement, employment contract or managerial decision) that are at least as good 
as those in a Swedish central branch agreement.’71 The short paragraph reveals a subtle but 
fundamental shift from a dialogic model of industrial relations to a situation in which all the 
partners have to do (and in this case, crucially, the employer) is to show that the working 
conditions are comparable to the terms agreed at a local level. Not surprisingly, the 
amendment was immediately criticised by the LO and a request was made for the ILO to 
examine its compliance with the conventions on the right to union membership and 
collective negotiations72. The Committee in its 2010 Report  refers to the case in the 
following terms: ‘[…] the omnipresent threat of an action for damages that could bankrupt 
the union, possible now in the light of the Viking and Laval judgements, creates a situation 
where the rights under the Convention cannot be exercised73. This of course raises the 
question of a possible normative conflict between the obligations arising under the acquis 
communitaire and Sweden’s (and the other EU countries) international obligations under the 
ILO Conventions. Equally, the spectre of fragmentation and normative dissonance has been 
raised with respect of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
right of association, which is going in an opposite direction to the ECJ’s stance in the Laval 
quartet74.  
 
The repercussions extended at the domestic legal level, with a new judgment by the 
Arbetsdomstolen. As a consequence of the preliminary ruling by the ECJ, Laval raised its 
demand for damages to three million SEK75, while the trade unions argued that there should 
not be liability for damages resting on the trade unions, as the breach of EU law was 
attributable to the Swedish State76, and in any case the trade unions’ action was legal in 
Swedish law at the time it was taken, questioning the retroactive application of the ECJ’s 
ruling to a dispute between private parties in order to establish civil liability. The 
Arbetsdomstolen disagreed on both grounds (liability for damages under EU law, for violation 
                                                 
70 Report of the Swedish Government, note 25, 35.  
71 Prop 2009/10:48. The new bill amends the Posting of Workers Act by adding Section 5a. Additionally, the 
Lex Britannia could not be applied to any undertaking posting workers to Sweden, including those from 
outside the EU. An exception of constitutionality was argued for the proposal by the opposition parties, but 
rejected by the Supreme Court (see Rönnmar (n 67) 286).   
72 For a summary of the LO’s objections to the Committee, see the text of the Complaint submitted to the 
European Committee of Social Rights, note 68, 20). The Committee pronounced on the cases in its Report of 
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (2010) ilolex nr 
062010GBR087; the Report is available on the ILO website, <www.ilo.org/> accessed 12 October 2012; see 
also Kerstin Ahlberg, ‘Will the Lex Laval work?’ Nordic Labour Journal, 2 November 2010.  
73 At 209; this statement was in response to a request raised by the British Airline Pilots’ Association 
(BALPA).  
74 Demir and Baykara v Turkey, App no 34503/97 (ECtHR 12 November 2008); and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v 
Turkey, App no 68959/01 (ECtHR 21 April 2009) reaffirming that the right to strike and collective bargaining 
is protected under art 11 of the Convention. See Keith Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of 
Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39(1) Industrial Law Journal 2.  
75 283,000 GBP. 
76 Ss 54 and 55 MBL provide the rules on liability for breaches of the MBL; the rules were applied by analogy 
by the Court to assess the damages for the breach of EU law.  
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of art 4977, and under Swedish law, for breach of the MBL78), and with the minimum 
majority required (four judges out of seven) established that the unions were liable, 
establishing the amount at 700,000 SEK in punitive damages and two million SEK in 
litigations costs79. As noted previously, there is no right of appeal from the Arbetsdomstolen, 
safe for miscarriage of justice resulting from an ‘obvious’ and ‘grave’ mistake in law80. This 
the trade unions have done, requesting a ruling from the Supreme Court81; the Supreme 
Court, maybe predictably, refused their request82. Calls were made for the Swedish State to 
pay the damages83, but they were ultimately paid by the Swedish trade unions to the 
administrator of the company, Laval having declared bankruptcy. It may be superfluous, in 
this context, to remark on the chilling effect of the Arbetsdomstolen judgment on the right of 
trade unions to resort to industrial action, given the extension of liability for action deemed 
legal by the Arbetsdomstolen itself at the time it was taken. Suffice to notice that the 
Arbetsdomstolen imposed punitive damages on the trade unions for having failed to predict 
that their action would have fallen foul of EU law, when the Arbetsdomstolen itself was not 
certain that this was the case, so much so that it refused the demand for an injunction by 
Laval and it requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on that very question. In fact, the 
Arbetsdomstolen was able to impose damages under Swedish law only by disapplying the Lex 
Britannia, which was the object of the second question posed to the ECJ. 
The repercussion at the European level include the joint report produced by the European 
Social Partners at the invitation of the European Commission84, which highlights the chasm 
between the partners on the assessment of the consequences of the ECJ rulings, with the 
employers’ representative favourably commenting on the interpretation of the ECJ being 
‘helpful to avoid uncertainty […] and to assure a ground of fair competition; on their part, 
ETUC remarked that ‘the argument of “legal certainty” cannot be used as an excuse to 
                                                 
77 Following the case law of the ECJ on horizontal direct effect in the area of competition law, eg Case C-
453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-6297 and 
applying the criteria for Member State liability established in Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, joined Cases C-
46/93 and C-48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029.  Even in the absence of any precedent on liability for damages for 
breaches of art 49 by private parties (horizontal direct effect), the Arbetsdomstolen did not think it necessary to 
request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on this point, even if the parties had request so at the time of the 
first request for a preliminary ruling in 2005.  
78 As the ECJ had established in its ruling the Lex Britannia to be unlawful under art 49 EC, the 
Arbetsdomstolen was bound to apply the Britannia Principle instead, under which the industrial action was found 
to be unlawful, with again ss 54 and 55 of the MBL applicable for establishing liability and punitive damages.  
79 Niklaas Bruun, ‘The Laval case, act III – Sweden’s Labour Court rules union must pay high damages, 
Nordic Labour Journal, 12 January 2010.  The Arbetsdomstolen delivered its judgment on 2 December 2009 
(Arbetsdomstolen AD 2009:89). 
80 Note 26.  
81 Kerstin Ahlbeg, ‘Swedish unions want annulment of Laval judgment’, Nordic Labour Journal, 18 May 2010.  
82 Kerstin Ahlbeg, ‘Curtain fall for the Laval case’, Nordic Labour Journal, 31 August 2010. 
83 The decision to assign liability for punitive damages to the unions for having exercised their right to resort 
to industrial action disregards the primary characteristic of this right, which is the immunity from civil 
liability (taking into account that the action was legal under Swedish law, as recognised by the same court in 
its 2005 judgment). See Tonia Novitz, ‘Labour Rights as Human Rights: Implications for Employers’ Free 
Movement in an Enlarged European Union’,  in Catherine Barnard (ed), (2007) 9 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Law 357;  Filip Dorssemont, ‘The Right to take Collective Action Versus Fundamental  
Economic Freedoms in the Aftermath of Laval and Viking: Foes are Forever!’, in Marc De Vos and Catherine 
Barnard (eds.), European Union Internal Market and Labour Law: Friends or Foes?, (Intersentia 2009) 45. The 
Arbetsdomstolen could have interpreted EU law so as to exclude or limit liability for individuals because the 
unlawfulness of the action is only the first step to establish liability, and it is not quite clear that damages 
would have been granted as a matter of EU law; additionally, the Court could have applied s 60 of the MBL, 
which allows to reduce or waive damages if deemed reasonable under the circumstances.  
84 Report on joint work of the European social partners on the ECJ rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and 
Luxembourg cases, of 19 March 2010, available on the European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”) website 
<www.etuc.org/> accessed 12 October 2012.  
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interfere with the essential features of national labour law and industrial relations systems’ 
and concluded that ‘The sustainability of industrial relations has been threatened.’  
 
On a legislative level, negotiations have been ongoing on a Directive on the enforcement of 
the Posted Workers Directive, first suggested by President Barroso in 2009; an amendment 
proposed by the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure is currently awaiting its first reading. A parallel 
proposal for a Council Regulation under the Consent Procedure on the exercise of the right 
to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services is at preparatory phase in Parliament85.  
 
Finally, as mentioned above, the Swedish LO and TOC have submitted a complaint to the 
European Committee of Social Rights against Sweden, requesting that the Committee 
pronounce on their claim that the Lex Laval violates Sweden’s obligations with respect to 
arts 4, 6 and 19.4 of the European Social Charter86 and ILO C.98 (art 4) and C.15487. The 
complaint has just been lodged and there is no way of knowing how it will be assessed. It is 
interesting to note how the trade unions turn the ECJ’s argument about the lack of clarity 
of the pay agreements on its head, by remarking that the new legislative framework makes 
it impossible for trade unions to predict if their industrial action will be deemed lawful, or if 
it will attract punitive damages and they conclude with the following gloomy prediction, 
worth quoting in full: 
 
The combination of the new rules on industrial peace and full financial tort liability without 
a negligence requirement has led to great wariness on the part of the trade union 
organisations as regards signing collective agreements with foreign employers. The fear felt 
by the trade union organisations of doing the wrong thing by mistake and putting the 
organisation at risk of being forced to pay high levels of damages has meant that there has 
been a severe fall in the number of collective agreements signed as regards foreign 
companies carrying on business in Sweden. This means that foreign workers are entirely 
without protection as regards reasonable terms and conditions of pay and employment when 
they are working in the Swedish labour market and that Swedish workers are exposed to 
competition from workers with very low pay and wretched employment conditions. In the 
long term there is a risk that this will have negative repercussions for the entire Swedish 
labour market model’88. 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
                                                 
85 See information on the website <www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/empl/work-in-
progress.html#menuzone> accessed 12 October 2012.  The ETUC has already issued a position on the 
proposed Directive, which requests major revisions to address its shortcomings, outlined in the position paper, 
see <www.etuc.org/a/10037> accessed 12 October 2012. The proposed Council Regulation, on its part, has 
resulted, in July 2012, in the first ‘yellow card’ from national parliaments (including the Swedish one), under 
art 7.2 of Protocol 2 to the Lisbon Treaty; as per procedure, the draft regulation will now have to be reviewed 
by the Commission, but there is no legal obligation of amendment or withdrawal 
(<http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/news/Pages/Early-Warning-System-First---yellow-card--
.aspx> accessed 12 October 2012). 
86 European Social Charter (opened for signature 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965) 
CETS No. 035; the articles concern the right to a fair remuneration, the right to bargain collectively, and the 
right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance (non-discrimination in remuneration, 
working conditions and employment matters, including trade union participation).  
87 For C.98 see n 36; ILO Convention 154, Promoting Collective Bargaining (adopted 3 June 1981, entered 
into force 11 August 1983) 1331 UNTS 268. 
88 Complaint to the European Committee of Social Rights (n 68) 28.  
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It is important to improve working conditions and wages in competing countries, in order to 
raise the floor89. 
 
The above quote is from an interview with a Swedish trade unionist on the subject of the 
ESD at sectoral level; when uttered, the Court had not delivered its Laval Judgment, with 
its well-known transformation of the floor provided by the Posted Workers Directive into a 
ceiling of what is obtainable through industrial action. One is left to wonder what this trade 
unionist would make of the sleight of hand by the Court.  
 
The reverberations of this Judgment go well beyond the low numbers involved, as is often 
the case: 35 Latvian workers involved in the actual dispute, and a total of posted workers in 
Sweden at the time of the dispute estimated to be at about 2,200, inclusive of about 1,050 in 
the building sector90. Charles Woolfson has rightly noted that Latvia might have used the 
dispute, and Laval instrumentally, in order to ‘prise open new markets in the EU’ and 
certainly the facts of the dispute, and especially its political background, give support to this 
hypothesis91. To this, further strategic considerations can be added, that have to do more 
with prising open the legal structure of industrial relations that Swedish workers have 
developed in cooperation with capital over almost a century.  This strategy of legal 
disruption has domestic and European elements. It is public knowledge that Laval was 
supported financially, in bringing its case in the Arbetsdomstolen, by the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, who had, as once again Woolfson noted, ‘long argued in favour of 
reducing the scope of trade union industrial action, especially with regard to sympathy 
action affecting so-called “third parties”’ 92. The legislative changes at the domestic level 
have been investigated in depth throughout this article and bear out the impression that it is 
more than the destiny of a limited number of foreign workers posted in Sweden to be the 
concern and the real target of the statutory intervention, as pointedly noted by the trade 
unions in the closing paragraph of their complaint reported above.  
 
At the European level, it will be useful to remind the reader that Swedish law already 
contained, in Sections 54 and 55 MBL, the imposition of economic and punitive damages for 
breach of the social peace after the conclusion of a collective agreement. In the strictly 
private law relationship established between the parties, the Swedish State intervenes to 
punish the unions for unlawful resort to strike action under limited conditions. In a double 
move of deracination or de- and re-localisation, the ECJ and the Swedish Labour Court 
(applying EU law, or maybe misapplying it) have localised to Sweden EU law by embedding 
the restrictions of the Posted Workers Directive and giving it the force of hard law in a 
model of industrial relations predicated upon ‘soft’ methods of dialogic exchange, and 
Europeanised the Swedish imposition of punitive damages for unlawful industrial action, 
                                                 
89 Interview with a Swedish trade unionist on the topic of European Sectoral Social Dialogue, as reported by 
Sofia Murhem, ‘Implementation of the Sectoral Social Dialogue in Sweden’, in Anne Dufresne, Christophe 
Degryse and Philippe Pochet (eds.), The European Sectoral Social Dialogue. Actors, Developments and Challenges 
(Peter Lang 2006) 281, 292.  
90 The numbers are taken from the Eurofound website, <www.eurofound.europa.eu/> accessed 12 October 
2012; the website offers a clear disclaimer on the accuracy of the figure, as no official data is collected. Similar 
statistics, collected by the unions, are provided in the Swedish Government Official Report, note 25, 10.  
91 Charles Woolfson and Jeff Sommers, ‘Labour Mobility in Construction: European Implications of the Laval 
un Partneri Dispute with Swedish Labour’ (2006) 12(1) European Journal of Industrial Relations 49, 56. Some 
interesting background on the political dimension of the dispute in Alban Davesne, ‘The Laval Case and the 
Future of Labour Relations in Europe’, Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po. No 01/2009, Paris: Centre 
d’études Européennes.   
92 Woolfson and others (n 26) 15. The quote refers to information provided in Jan Peter Duker, ‘Ett 
arbetsgivarperspektiv på medling’, in Anne-Marie Egerö and Birgitta Nyström (eds.), Hundra år av medling I 
Sverige: Jubileumsskrift: Historik, analys och framtidsvisioner (Medlinginstitutet 2006) 184. 
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which is inconsistent with any other model of labour law that does not include the 
substantive guarantees under a meaningful social dialogue that the Swedish model 
provides93. In doing so they set adrift the Swedish prohibition to strike under penalty of 
punitive damages and allowed it ‘to strike’ in quite a different way, as the members of the 
British Association of Airline Pilots (“BALPA”) found out when their employer British 
Airways decided to seek an injunction in the English courts on the basis of the unlawfulness 
of a proposed strike action, and to seek punitive damages to the order of 100 million GBP 
per day were the strike to take place94. 
 
In its complaint to the European Committee of Social rights95 the LO puts it succinctly but 
clearly: ‘[….] in these cases96 collective agreement free zones are created in the Swedish labour 
market, where it is only possible to conclude a collective agreement if the employer accepts 
it voluntarily’ [emphasis added]97. Similarly to the Export Processing Zones (“EPZ”) that 
are a common feature in developing countries98 these zones signify the transformation of the 
Western labour market in the direction of a de-westernisation and they do so by depriving 
the trade unions of their speaking position and reducing them to passive listeners.  
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Europeanisation is not intended here in the traditional sense of ‘an incremental process of re-orienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC [EU] political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organisational logic of national politics and policy making’ (see Robert Ladrech, ‘Europeanisation of Domestic 
Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’ (1994) 32 Journal of Common Market Studies 69, 69 as quoted 
in Zahn, note 51); rather it is intended to convey the concept of a policy or law deracinated, that is, taken out 
of its local context, and re-embedded both in its national context, but having been decontextualised, and in a 
new international or, in this case, European context.  
94 BALPA called off the strike but submitted a complaint to the ILO Committee of Experts, see supra note 71 
and appealed against the interim injunction granted by McCombe J dated 17 May 2010. For the appeal in the 
courts see British Airways PLC v Unite The Union [2010] EWCA Civ 669. 
95 Note 68, 22. 
96 Where, by application of the new Section 5(a)(2) of the Posting of Workers Act, collective action is not 
lawful if the employer has shown that the minimum conditions of employment are respected, even without a 
binding agreement.  
97 This voluntariness constitutes the Habermasian element of the Swedish system only insofar as it does not 
extend to the meta-level of the framework; in other words, it has to be accepted by the social partners that the 
voluntariness does not include the possibility not to enter into a dialogue at all, and to impose labour 
conditions derived from exogenous sources (such as the hard statutory provisions that form the object of the 
LO criticism). 
98 Information on the EPZs at <www.ilo.org/public/english/support/lib/resource/subject/epz.htm> 
accessed 12 October 2012.  
